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  2Enhancing the Efficacy of the EuroMed Partnership 
through intensified Iterations
♦ 
 
Astrid B. Boening
♣ 
 
 Introduction 
 
The conference on the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) in Crete in October 2007 shows considerable 
synchronicity with the current focus of the EU presidency under Portugal and its interest in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region. An additional “sign of spring” for the EuroMed region is the recent 
conference of all EU European Neighborhood Program (ENP) foreign ministers as a group to 
assess the potential for ENP enhancement. It served as a forum to exchange suggestions for 
approaches which have been successful in the ENP, such as the EuroCities Program, to augment 
the economic and social development of the countries surrounding the EU overall in order to bring 
reciprocal stability and enhance the EU’s neighbors’ prosperity. And of course the current 
significance of the EMP’s role in particular to contribute to the prosperity and socio-political 
stability of the EU’s southern neighbors is especially significant in view of the expected 
destabilizing spill-over in relation to the current war in Iraq.  
        Furthermore  challenges  to  Mediterranean stability current are e.g. the potential of the 
drastically increasing Chinese investments in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. the backyard of the EMP’s 
southern border) may contribute little to transparency and accountability in these countries, and 
may be of questionable value in enhancing the socio-political development and stabilization of sub-
Saharan Africa and its neighbors in the Magreb. Similarly, the fate of the Palestinian territories, 
especially the economies of the West Bank and Gaza following the recent divisions by Hamas and 
the Palestinian Authority and Israel’s ensuing even greater restrictions on the movement of their 
people and goods into and out of Israel, which represent an additional area of the EMP region in 
dire need of economic development and political stabilization (Blitz 2007; Wilson 2007). 
         This  paper  argues  that  the  ambitious goals formulated during the Barcelona Process in 
November 1995 address those elements which have been recognized in the literature as significant 
in enhancing the reciprocal relationship between economic development, political stability and 
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  3socio-cultural understanding within and among regions. While there has been no shortage of 
initiatives to contribute to the socio-economic and political stabilization of the Magreb and Mashriq 
in past years, such as the G-8’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Fora for the Future in 2004 - 
2006 (in which the EMP was included), for example, as cooperative efforts for regional civil 
society and business groups to express their reform goals to their governments and to “advance the 
universal values of human dignity, democracy, economic opportunity and social justice” (U.S. 
Department of State November 7. 2005, 1), few have succeeded in contributing to a unified zone of 
peace, not to mention in establishing a security community in Karl Deutsch’s terms, and much less 
to establishing a Euro-Mediterranean security complex in Buzan and Waever’s terminology, aside 
from NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. In fact, the International Crisis Group calls the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa Initiative “imperiled at birth” (ICG briefing 7 June 2004), 2). 
Nevertheless, regional integration in the Middle East has made strides in the past decade especially, 
e.g. in a broader context with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
1 taking an active role in balancing 
between trade with Iran and their support of Sunnis in Iraq (Kerr and Bozorgmehr, 2007). 
         In its almost twelve years existence, the EMP has nevertheless made significant strides in 
increasing harmonization of trade between the northern and southern EMP member states, 
migration policies and in increasing cultural understanding among the very diversified Magreb, 
Mashriq and EU EMP-partner countries. Despite this continual evolution, many would agree that 
the EMP relationship could be substantially enhanced, last but not least due to the newly enhanced 
EU Neighborhood Policy overall, as well as the declared goal of EMP partners for an economic 
Free Trade area (EFTA) among them (to say nothing of the need for peace in the South-Eastern 
Mediterranean now more than ever).  
        Some broadcasts of speeches from the recent ENP ministerial conference on September 5, 
2007 also suggest that not only interactions among ENP members need to become more routinized, 
but that the EMP specifically would benefit from a more structured approach to its integration 
according to its Barcelona goals: economic, political and socio-cultural.  
 
The EMP from a Security Perspective 
 
To recall, the EMP strives to be a strictly civic approach to regional integration, increased 
development and prosperity and increased understanding between the cultures among its member 
states, and is hence distinctly secular, regardless – or perhaps especially because of - the European 
history of jihads, crusades and reconquistas. It recognizes:  
            1. the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of a 
political and security dialogue; 
            2. the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial 
partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; 
     3. and the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership 
aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil society 
(Horizon 2020 Bulletin 2005, 2). 
         Addressing these three general areas in the EMP from the very start indicates the recognition 
by its founders which the different sectors (in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s terminology) (1998) 
in the EMP structure play in security: in addition to the traditional military and political to also 
include environmental, individual/“societal”, and economic security. 
                                                           
     
1 The GCC was formed in 1981 in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the outbreak of the Iran-
Iraq war by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain (Financial Times 
September 18, 2007), in which the Gulf states backed the Sunni regime in Iraq. 
  4         How then can the EMP be evaluated from a security standpoint? International organizations 
(IOs) overall are considered to reduce anarchy due to the structure of cooperation they build in the 
international system (e.g. the UN), based on increased trust (due to explicitly written rules and the 
transparency this fosters) (e.g. Keohane 1988, 1984; Krasner 1983; Kratochwil 1993; and Ruggie 
1998), the lengthened shadow of the future (according to Rousseau’s fable of the stag hunt) making 
defection from the IO less likely and hence expanding trust among its members. IOs enable a 
solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Oye 1986; Olson, 1971) by allowing for a changeable pay-off 
matrix to make cooperation likely by changing the interests of the actors, and hence reduce 
transaction costs. According to these theories, the benefits of well-functioning IOs lead to absolute 
gains
2 for all states who are members of the IO/regime, large and small, (though under sub-optimal 
conditions) and, as a result also effect more peaceful cooperation between states.  
        I  argue  in  this  paper  that  cooperation among all EMP members could be augmented by 
modifying individual preferences of states
3 and their actors to one of enhanced joint cooperation in 
order to enhance the security within the EMP regime, since security is not divisible among 
different sectors of a single country (witness any sectarian violence in a country), nor divisible 
between neighboring countries (e.g. Iran-Iraq), and, ultimately, not divisible ultimately globally. 
 
Collective security 
 
In this paper I argue that a social-constructivist approach (e.g. Wendt 1999; Buzan et al. 1998; 
Reus-Smit 2005) to the security dilemmas (e.g. Jervis 1999) facing the Euro-Mediterranean region 
historically is helpful as it focuses on the construction of ideas (which in turn inform preferences) 
through social learning, which impact (Kaufman 2001) identity (re-)formulation, and their impact 
in (potentially) (reciprocally) (co-) constructing amicable structures among the parties involved in a 
security dilemma, especially when these include non-state actors (e.g. farmers of neighboring 
countries with watering rights disputes etc.), or religious factions, such as  within Islam, or among 
the different religions. By introducing the constructivist concept of “identity/interest”-construction 
(e.g. Moravcsik, 1997) into the process of this type of cooperation, neo-liberals recognize that 
interests of states are neither homogenous nor eternally fixed, but can they can be “modified” to 
lead to better (more peaceful) outcomes for all members. There are also several other enabling and 
constraining variables in the neo-liberal program of “complex interdependence” (Keohane and 
Nye, 1977), such as Putnam’s (1993) Two-Level Games, which refer to plurality and its dynamics, 
and which can be modified in IOs/regimes to improve outcomes of their agendas.  
        This indicates that states have neither homogenous interests, nor that material (hard) power is 
the only deciding factor in many security dilemmas, but that soft power and negotiations, 
especially within an IO/regime-structure, can go a long way in providing paths to resolving 
conflicts.  It also shows that anarchy is not inevitable, but rather that it is “what states make of it” 
(Wendt 1992). This in turn points to the conclusion that collective security interests (e.g. Adler and 
Barnett, 1998) can be developed in an environment supportive of this effort. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
     
2 The enhanced debate to what extent states also benefit in relative terms under neo-liberal 
institutionalism will not be entered here due to parsimony 
     
3  and, ideally, the identity of (neighboring) states within the EMP from one of enmity to one of amity 
where this had been the case, in terms of  reciprocal agent-structure-interest formulation (Wendt 1999, 1987): 
compare the following sections 
  5Development as freedom?  
 
Amartya Sen has argued that security, socio-economic and political development are inseparable. 
This recognition is extremely significant e.g. as we face increased asymmetrical warfare, motivated 
by ideologies which often intend to distract from domestic problem as is the case to an extent in 
Iran and with Hamas in Gaza. In these cases, where purely material resources are neither 
automatically nor exclusively helpful, but rather the “hearts and minds” (i.e. the interests and ideas, 
for example) have to be “co”-engaged in dealing with this type of security threat. Hence security 
must consist not simply of more arms, but also a socio-economic integration (Jervis 1988, quoted 
in Wendt 1992, 393).           
        Some authors, such as Bettina Huber (2005, 3) writes that cooperation in the EMP is based on 
the assumption that deepening neighborhood relations cannot be achieved through governmental 
agreements alone, but that essential participation and contribution by civil society is urgently 
needed to bring the partnership to life and to create the greater understanding and closeness 
between the peoples envisioned by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. The EU posits the security 
environment of the EMP in the human dimension of good governance, human rights and the rule of 
law (Balfour 2004, 3).  
        While the intentions of the EMP are not only laudable but were intended to address many of 
the criteria which scholars and political leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace 
Conference) have identified as contributing to economic growth and development in general, 
hereby enhancing regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP is not legally binding, i.e. 
participation is not uniformly strong. Instead it applies concepts of “benchmarking” and 
“differentiation” on an individual country/case basis, “allowing countries to make progress without 
jeopardizing the entire regional approach” (European Commission: The EuroMed association 
agreements. 10/3/ 2006). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude a certain 
degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” (Flaesch-Mougin in Thiele 
and Kostelnik 2005, 63).  
         This approach by the EMP varies from a purely realist one which might suggest that the 
overall wealthier North might keep its distance and rather remain vigilant toward the Southern and 
Eastern regions of the Mediterranean. In fact, the EMP seeks to counteract the risks and threats 
from the Other, and to increase understanding between the cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) in 
Constructivist fashion. This is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the 
ENP, the latter having been accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches. 
 
Options for EMP Modalities to enhance its Regional Security Potential 
 
The EMP, as a distinct program of the European Neighborhood Policy
4, offers more flexibility, 
options and leeway than the latter. For one, the establishment of an EFTA within the EMP, while 
significant as mentioned above in addressing the reciprocal relationship between political stability, 
economic development and socio-cultural understanding and cooperation, as i.a Amartya Sen has 
argued, will not in itself contribute to the type of intra-regional network density which scholars, 
such as Robert Keohane, have argued as necessary for the quantitative iterations which lead to the 
benefits which institutions can provide their members in terms of transparency, increased trust, 
                                                           
       
4 “Neighbors” are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus*, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya*, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria*, Tunisia and Ukraine (* = participating as 
observers). Funding of the ENP by the EU has been increased by 32% for the period 2007-2013 
(International Herald Tribune September 2, 2007).  
  6reduced uncertainty and, as e.g. John G. Ruggie argues, the transformational benefits of 
international regimes in particular. 
        How  then  can  the  EMP  be  augmented to accelerate those transformations which can 
contribute to regional security? It is against this background that I propose utilizing some of the 
mechanisms and approaches, which the Central European Initiative (CEI) in Trieste has used in 
contributing to the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
5 following the Cold War. 
The Central European Initiative (CEI)
6, an intergovernmental organization (IGO) was founded by 
Italy and Austria in 1989 to undertake a regional integration process and to stabilize post-
communist CE democracies at a time when Austria’s and Italy’s eastern borders were threatened 
                                                           
      
5  The acronym “CE” will be used in this study to refer to the current member states of the Central European 
Initiative. CEI member states currently also encompass some Southern- and South-Eastern European countries as well as 
some NIS states, such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The reason this following geo-political complexity is elaborated 
below is to indicate the socio-political complexity of CE which has parallels with the great socio-political diversity 
among EMP members. 
         By comparison, in geographic terminology, Central Europe refers to “the region lying between the variously and 
vaguely defined areas of Eastern and Western Europe. In addition, Northern, Southern and Southeastern Europe may 
variously delimit or overlap into Central Europe. The understanding of the concept of Central Europe varies considerably 
from nation to nation and also has from time to time. The region is usually used to mean: Germany, Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia (Wikipedia, Central Europe). This 
region is defined by its geographic boundaries, the Baltic countries in the north and the Apennine peninsula (Italy) across 
the Alps. The east-west borders are culturally more fluid (Ibid.), since these countries were historically part “of the 
central European kingdoms and empires, such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Habsburg 
monarchy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Imperial Germany” (Ibid.). Within the cultural  definition the 
following countries belong to Central Europe: (western) Belarus, Croatia, Lithuania, Romania (Transylvania), Serbia 
(Vojvodina), Ukraine (Galicia, Volhynia, Pdolia) and Italy (South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) (Ibid.). Historically, 
following World War II, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia were considered Central European to 
distinguish them from those behind the iron curtain (i.e. Balkan-, Baltic and Russian Orthodox and Muslim countries) 
(Ibid.). 
        In  contrast,  Southern Europe refers geographically to the southern half of the landmass of Europe (Southern 
Europe – Wikipedia). “This definition is relative, with no clear limits” (Ibid.). While the Alps represent a north-south 
barrier in the eastern part, this boundary disappears further west. While the official UN designation does not include 
France, a climatic definition would only include the immediate land strip bordering the Mediterranean. Linguistically and 
culturally, one could divide Southern Europe into the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal, including Azores, Madeira), Spain 
(including Baleric Islands, Canary Islands), Andorra, Gibraltar, and Southern France (including Corsica), Monaco,  the 
Italian peninsula (including Sicily, Sardinia, Vatican City and San Marino), the Balkan Peninsula (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece (including Ionian Islands, Aegean Islands, and Crete), Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Slovenia and the European part of Turkey (Rumelia) plus the Mediterranean States of Cyprus and Malta (Ibid.). 
        Eastern Europe is similarly vaguely defined geographically as the region between Central Europe and Russia 
(Eastern Europe – Wikipedia), with the “eastern limit either the Ural Mountains or from the pacific coast of the Russian 
Far East [and] its western limit is the boundary between the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (sometimes excluding Kaliningrad)” (Ibid.). The overlap and fluctuation in regional boundaries extends politically 
to Eastern Europe covering “all of northeastern Eurasia, since Russia is one single transcontinental geopolitical entity. 
Cyprus is also frequently taken to be a European state, although geographically it is in Asia. The same approach is also 
sometimes taken with the post-Soviet states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus” (Ibid.). With the fall 
of the Iron Curtain, Eastern Europe refers retroactively sometimes to that European region which was part of the Soviet 
Union (Ibid.). Culturally Eastern Europe was defined by 19
th century German nationalists “synonymous with ‘Slavic 
Europe’, as opposed to Germanic (Western) Europe” (Ibid.).  
              Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovenia and Turkey are also sometimes referred to as Balkan countries.  
       As we can see, the geographic and cultural boundaries in this region are vague and socio-politically dependent (more 
on the topic of “fuzzy boundaries” in the sections on “Space and Boundaries” and “Identity and Ethnicity” of the 
literature review in Chapter Two).  
       
6 CEI membership as of June 2006 is comprised of the following eighteen countries: Albania, Austria, Belarus (this 
country represents an exception to regional membership but it does not influence the results of this case study), Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
  7by the neighboring political destabilization post-Cold War. In light of these huge geo-political 
realignments due to underlying socio-political instability, Western Europe became alarmed at the 
prospect of the potential spill-over effect from the civil wars and political upheavals in the Balkans. 
Though the concern was not in terms of spreading political unrest immediately into Western 
Europe, the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees, illegal weapons trading and other 
activities reflective of lawlessness due to ineffective new governments were cause for grave 
concern in countries bordering Central- and Eastern Europe. 
        This paper suggests that augmenting routine processes of the EMP by the model of those 
which are utilized by the CEI would contribute to increasing the efficacy of the EMP in attaining 
its goals in regional (political) stabilization through socio-economic development, and 
enhancement of the regional political institutionalization and civil society building. The CEI is a 
little known inter-governmental organization which was formed in 1989 by some EU members 
with initially just a few Eastern neighbors. Its goal is to assist them in the peaceful transition post-
Cold War to consolidated democracies and free market economies by involving them in a mutually 
“constructed” network regime structure (Krasner 1983; Ruggie 1998) of political, economic and 
social-cultural programs with routinized meetings of ministers and cabinet similarly to the EU, 
joint programs between countries based on consensus to engage democratic processes between 
countries which may not have been previously at peace with each other, and joint social and 
economic programs to enhance regional integration. While in financial terms these programs are 
relatively modest, the norming effect, the political harmonization, i.a. through spill-over from 
(functional) economic development programs (compare E. Haas) between member countries 
(which now are much more numerous and diverse), and the political stabilization, to which CEI 
programs contribute in no small measure, have led to an impressive mutual co-constitution of 
(peaceful) agents and structures in CEE
7. 
        Were the EMP to develop a more routinized structure and hereby increase its iterations among 
members, e.g. through the model which the CEI could provide
8 to enhance the EMP’s public 
institutionalization, education, and involvement of the private sector not only in business 
promotion, but also ostensibly in taking corporate social responsibility in the EMP’s overall 
political, economic and socio-cultural programs, the goals of the EMP as a regional security 
complex (e.g. in terms of Barry Buzan, based on Karl Deutsch) and Economic Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) could be enhanced through this thickened institutionalization and routinized participation 
of all EMP members, rather than making it a top- (“Brussels”) down project. 
        The Euro-Mediterranean is not a zero-sum game but needs to be recognized and supported as 
an endeavor for cumulative growth on all shores of the Mediterranean to achieve peace and 
stability within and among all its members. Escríbánó (2005) points out that the ENP’s economic 
prescriptions overall are perceived as merely cosmetic. The EMP per se needs to continue to focus 
on the increased participation of its members in an EFTA, involving the Four Freedoms (of the 
movement of goods, services, capital, and workforce), in addition to all the other options it offer 
them socio-culturally and for political regional integration. It is about inclusion rather than 
exclusion. 
         Without  some  “augmentation”  to  enhance aspects of security, such as e.g. civil society, 
institutionalization, environmental sustainability, gender equality in education to satisfy future 
employment requirements of EMP member states in their anticipated economic expansion, the 
                                                           
      
7 Measurable in the case of the CEI in terms of the speed in which some members were able to become EU members, 
although one must remember that not all CEI-members, similarly to the South- and Eastern Mediterranean EMP 
members, are potential EU candidates per se. 
     
8 the great extent and modi operandi utilized by the CEI currently being too extensive to be detailed in this 
paper,  but which are, of course, available from the author or from contacting the CEI in Trieste directly. 
  8EMP’s FTA with the Southern and Easter Mediterranean might just become another Caricom, 
Mercosur, or Andean Community, I draw the parallel with how the Central European Initiative 
contributed to the stabilization of the new, post-communist Central Europe (CE) similarly to how 
the current war in Iraq has the potential for increased regional destabilization, particularly in the 
Middle East as well as the spread of  asymmetrical warfare (“the war on terror”) to neighboring 
continents in addition to previous instabilities in the region.  
         While several European regions, sub-regions, local governments (Stavridis 2003) as well as 
non-state actors have multiple socio-political and economic agreements and arrangements with 
North African countries and the Middle East, this paper focuses on EU-level interactions with non-
EU Mediterranean countries on a level of equal partners within the EMP, rather than on an EU top-
down, uni-directional process of regional integration, security and socio-political stability in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region. As such a security community, the region may also re-define its raison 
d’etre  in the future as a Mediterranean Security Complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Crawford (2007) writes e.g. that today’s migrants from North Africa to the EU, especially Spain, 
see it as a land of opportunity, and seek job contracts and residence permits, not conquest. Yet it is 
exactly this often welcomed migration which still needs to address the integration of human beings 
on all shores of the Mediterranean to permit each to have a share in belonging to this dream, rather 
than perpetuating those that belong, and those that are simply “others”. It is about creating a new 
“we” in this region (compare research by Putnam 2007). It is about integration, rather than 
segregation. (Kuper 2007). As the GCC has recognized, and as the EMP needs to follow: it is about 
renewed attention to domestic economic development to reduce the huge amounts of government 
revenue traditionally earmarked for defense (Kerr 2007). 
         Were the EMP to increase its iterations among members, e.g. through the model which the 
CEI could provide, in its political, economic and socio-cultural programs, the goals of the EMP as 
a regional security complex could be enhanced through development envisioned to address the 
different security sectors
9 i.a. economic development and prosperity, environmental security, 
societal security, e.g. socio-cultural  issues such as gender equality, which not only have not been 
achieved world-wide, but especially not in countries bordering the southern Mediterranean, which 
in turn can contribute to additional tensions in integration of different religions, to name a few. 
        At the same time we need to be alert to what several authors, such as Goldstone (2007) have 
referred to as the distributional consequences of international trade, producing not only relative 
winners and losers in each society, which then of course affect these groups’ relative foreign policy 
preferences – which the EU, as does the CEI, explicitly try to resolve from the start. Goldstone 
showed in his research that “cooperative and multilateral security policies will likely encourage 
peace, while conformational and unilateral policies are more likely to lead to conflict” (ibid.), 
phenomena enhanced by globalization influences on specific instances.  
                It is this context that Ulrich Beck (in Judt 2007) poses the need for promote a more 
cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law. It is not about taking sides (compare Khalaf 
2007), but as Juergen Habermas (in Judt 2007) has stated, as “governance beyond the nation-state”. 
While a Mediterranean Union (compare Bennhold 2007) may as yet be a faint glimmer on the 
horizon, the EMP affords avenues which need to be broadened to be frequented. It is not simply a 
European impulse, but one supported by many of its southern and south-eastern neighbors, as 
frequent calls from this region confirm (compare Associated Free Press September 43 2007, Cohen 
                                                           
     
9  With the exception of the military which is handled nationally by member states and multi-laterally 
through NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. 
  92007). Peace is increasingly neither a single state’s achievement, nor based on a single sector, the 
military, as in the past. Rather, security needs to be addressed multi-laterally, multi-sectorally, and 
on different levels, from sub-state to the state to the regional and beyond to be successful. 
        As  we  know,  peace  processes  in  the  Middle East are still more hope than reality at the 
moment, with the extent of spillover from possible greater regional fragmentation post-Iraq yet 
unknown, and future threats, be they cyber threats or questions of energy security, growing daily. 
In this institutional vacuum of other regional security cooperative institutions, such as the Arab 
Maghreb Union or the Arab League (Vasconcelos 1999, 30), the realization of the EMP’s intent to 
extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability”, utilizing proven approaches of 
EU soft power, and CEI specific modi operandi, to address regional (in-) security in the 
Mediterranean through step-by-step processes of harmonization are more urgent than ever, 
especially as extra-regional threats have increasingly more harmful potential. 
 
References  
Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett ed. 1998. Security communities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Adler, Emanuel, Beverly Crawford. 2004. Normative Power: The European Practice of Region 
Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Berkeley/CA: Institute 
of European Studies, University of California.  
Adler, Emanuel, Peter Haas. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the 
Creation of a Reflective Research Program. International Organization 46, no. 1: 367-390.  
AFP. Jordan king urges greater EU role for Mideast peace.  
Anderson, Perry. Depicting Europe: book review of "Postwar" by Tony Judt. London Review of 
Books (Sep. 20, 2007) .  
AP. EU presses neighbors for change in return for aid. International Herald Tribune Sep. 2, 2007. 
 Batt, Judy. 2003. Partners and neighbors: A CFSP for a wider Europe. Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies.  
Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. 2004. Das kosmopolitische Europa. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.  
Bennhold, Katrin. Sarkozy's proposal for Mediterranean bloc makes waves. International Herald 
Tribune May 10, 2007.  
Blitz, James. Economic stability vital for Middle East peace. Financial Times Sep. 18, 2007.  
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. Regions and powers. Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP.  
Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A new framework for analysis. 
Boulder, CO and London, England: Lynne Rienner.  
  10Christiansen, Thomas, Knud E. Jorgensen, and Antje Wiener. 1999. The Social Construction of 
Europe. Journal of European Public Policy special issue 6, no. 4: 528-544.  
Christiansen, Thomas, Fabio Petito, and Ben Tonra. 2000. Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: 
The European Union's 'Near Abroad'. Cooperation and Conflict, 385.  
Cohen, Roger. The Middle East: Two steps in one go. International Herald Tribune Aug. 16, 2007.  
Crawford, Beverly. 2006. The impact of enlargement on the euro-med partnership. In Towards the 
completion of Europe. Miami, FL: Jean Monnet Chair/University of Miami: Vol. 5, NO. 23.  
Crawford, Leslie. Today's migrants 'seek jobs not conquest'. Financial Times Sep. 9, 2007.  
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.  
Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice J. Lee, Martin Lichtermann, 
Lindgren, Raymond, E., Loewenheim, Francis, L., and Van Wagenen, Richard W. 1957. 
Political community and the North Atlantic area. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Escríbánó, Gonzalo. 2005. Europeanisation without Europe? A critical reflection on the 
Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean. Barcelona: Report by Real Instítútó Elcánó. 
Available from: 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org:9081/wps/myportal/rielcano/Convocatoria?WCM_GLO... 
{3/3/2007]. 
European Commisison. Barcelona declaration. Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/bed.htm>. [10/3, 2006].  
European Commisison. Financial Cooperation/MEDA programme. Internet on-line. Available 
from <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm>. 2006.  
European Commission. Corporate social responsibility. Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/csr/index_en.htm>. [11/6/2006].  
European Commission. 5th EuroMed trade ministerial conference Marrakech 24 march 
2006.Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/euromed/ministerial2006/stplay_en...
>. [10/3, 2006].  
European Commission. Financial Cooperation/MEDA programme. Internet on-line. Available 
from <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm>. [10/3, 2006].  
European Commission. The EuroMed association agreements. Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/euromed/aa>en.htm>. [10/3, 2006].  
New signs of life in Euro-Med partnership. EuropeanVoice.com.  
  11Goldstone, P. R. Does Globalization Bring War or Peace? AlterNet (Sep. 25, 2007).  
Guthrie, Jonathan. Women of Birminghamabad forge their own identity. Financial Times Sep. 14, 
2007.  
Haas, Ernst. 1964. Beyond the nation state: Functionalism and international organization. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Haas, Ernst. 1961. International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. International 
Organization , no. 15: 366-392.  
Haas, Ernst. 1958. The uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic forces, 1950 - 1957. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Haas, Peter. 1992. Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. International 
Organization 46, no. 1: Special Issue.  
Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. 
International Organization 46: 1-36.  
Habermas, Juergen. 1972. Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.  
Huber, Bettina. 2005. Views of civil society representatives from the Middle East and Maghreb on 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Heinrich Boell Stiftung Middle East Occasional Papers 
No. 1. 
International Crisis Group. The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Imperiled at 
Birth. (June 7, 2004).  
Ivanova, Kate, Todd Sandler. CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study. Foreign Policy 
Analysis 3, no. 4 (October 2007).  
Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. 
International Security 24, no. 1: 42-63.  
Kaufman, Stuart. 2001. Modern hatreds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 
Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies 
Quarterly 32: 379-396.  
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Keohane, Robert O., and Stanley Hoffmann. 1991. The new European community. Boulder: 
Westview Press.  
Keohane, Robert O., Joseph Nye. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics: an 
Introduction. International Organization 25, no. 3: 329-350.  
  12Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and interdependence: World politics in 
transition. Boston: Little, Brown and company.  
Kerr, Simeon, Najmeh Bozorgmehr. Arab Gulf states to hold trade talks with Teheran. Financial 
Times Sep. 18, 2007.  
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. International regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. Defending the national interest. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
Kratchowil, Friedrich, John G. Ruggie. 1986. International Organization: A State of the Art on an 
Art of the State. International Organization 40, no. 4: 753-775.  
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1993. Contract and Regimes. Do Issue Specificity and Variations of 
Formality Matter? Tuebingen/Germany Center for International Relation/Peace and Conflict 
Studies, Institute for Political Science, University of Tuebingen.  
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1982. On the notion of "interest" in international relations. International 
Organization 36, no. 1: 30.  
Lawson, George. 2006. The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations. 
International Studies Review 8: 397-423.  
Leidel, Steffen. Interview with Theologian Kuehn: Christianity Gets on Many People's Nerves.  
Martin, Lisa. 1992. Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. International Organization 46: 765.  
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international 
cooperation. International Organization 53, no. 2: 267-306.  
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to 
Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics. International Organization 51, no. 4: 513-553.  
Moravcsik, Andrew, Milada A. Vachudova. 2003. National Interests, State Power, and EU 
Enlargement. East European Politics and Societies 17, no. 1: 42.  
Olson, Marcur. 1971. The logic of collective action. New York: Schocken Books.  
Oye, Kenneth. 1986. Cooperation under anarchy. Princeton University Press: Princeton.  
Pahre, Robert. 1994. Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2: 326-352.  
  13Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Reus-Smit, Christian. 2005. Constructivism. In Theories of international relations. New York, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan.  
Risse, Thomas. 2004. European institutions and identity change: What have we learned? In 
Transnational identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.  
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1996. Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory 
and Comparative Policy analysis - Meet the European Union. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34, no. March.  
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Bringing transnational relations back in: Non-state actors, domestic 
structures, and international institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ruggie, John G. 1998. Constructing the world polity. New York: Routledge.  
Sen, Amarthya. 1999. Development as freedom. New York, NY: Anchor House.  
Sharp, Jeremy M.  2005. The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An Overview.  
Spence, Rachel. Venice's love affair with the east. Financial Times Aug. 29, 2007.  
Stavridis, Stelios. 2004. The Catalan Parliament and the Mediterranean: a preliminary 
assessment. Mediterranean Quarterly 15:1, 75-92. 
Thornhill, John. French President to seek bolder global security role for Europe. Financial Times 
Aug. 28, 2007.  
U.S. Department of State. Broader Middle East and North Africa Region Forum for the Future, 
Bahrain 2005.  
U.S. State Department. G8 broader Middle East and North Africa initiative .Internet on-line. 
Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/utils/printpage.html>. July 8, 2007.  
United States Institute of Peace. The Broader Middle East and North Africa: Major Challenges 
Ahead. June 8, 2004.  
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics. International Organization 46: 391-425.  
  14  15
Wendt, Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. 
International Organization 41, no. 3: 335-370.  
Wilson, Scott. Hamas's New Order Exacts Toll on Gazans. Washington Post Sep. 17, 2007.   